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The Ethical Foundations 
of Bioethics 
by 
The Rev. Stanley L. Jaki 
This paper was written at the invitation of the Christian Ecumenical Amical 
Association, presented in Hungarian at the Association's meeting on bioethics, 
June 24, 1994. The author is the recipient of the 1987 Templeton Prize. 
The title may suggest either something superfluous or something outright 
ominous. If bioethics means simply ethics with an application to life 
phemomena, then it is superfluous to talk of its ethical foundations. But if 
bioethics means something else, then one faces something ominous, which is 
more than a mere possibility. For the fact is that bioethics, as widely understood 
nowadays, is without foundations worth being called ethical. 
Ethics has always been about life and nowhere is life more deeply involved 
than in questions that form the chief topics in bioethics. It is a very new field, in 
more than one way. In commenting on the establishment of the Hastings Center a 
mere twenty-five years ago, its retiring founder-president, Willard Gaylin, noted 
the disbelief prevailing at that time that "there was such a thing as bioethics. "1 But 
the real novelty is that most of those who since then have been writing on the 
subject have in mind a very novel form of ethics. Comparing it with ethics as 
generally understood until very recent times, one is faced with a frightening 
alternative: Either that "old" ethics was a delusion, or the ethics that parades in 
the form of bioethics is an ethics in name only, a cover-up for something else. 
The old ethics can easily be identified both in its conceptual structure and in its 
historical reality. As a conceptual structure it is a set of principles involving the 
categorical assertion that there is an inherent difference between what is morally 
good and what is morally evil; further, that man is able to know that difference; 
that he is able to know that the difference is not of his own making but inherent in 
a human nature in whose production the Creator is specifically involved; that 
therefore man is not his own master; that man, in feeling remorse for acting 
against what is morally good, senses a breakdown of his relation to his only 
master who is God; that there is a moral retribution that has an eternal 
perspective; that this eternal perspective makes no sense unless the end of man's 
physical life is not the end of his personal ethical existence; that partly because of 
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his moral consciousness man has a nature that has inalienable rights and 
responsibilities because its core is strictly spiritual. 
Even a cursory look at such a set of propositions can establish two important 
points about them individually and as a set. One is that all those principles are 
purely rational propositions and as such can be declared, developed, and debated 
by mere reliance on the powers of reason. The other concerns the historical 
matrix within which those propositions obtained their historical or cultural 
reality. Those propositions were first held and are still held as a set only within a 
genuinely Christian context. This fact distinguished Christianity, from its very 
start, not only from the pagan world but also from Judaism. While the pharisees, 
or the "orthodox" Jews of Jesus' time, believed in resurrection, subsequent 
Orthodox Jewish theology failed to develop a firm doctrine about the 
immortality of the soul. Even today, Orthodox Jewish theology shies away from 
the doctrine of the soul's immortality, with obvious consequences for framing its 
ethical propositions. As to liberal Judaism, usually connected nowadays with 
Conservative and especially with Reform Judaism, its set of ethical principles is 
very different from the set outlined above, especially in questions of bioethics. 
That Christian context or matrix of ethics arose because the earliest Christians 
looked upon a series of historical events - the life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ - as God's most remarkable supernatural intervention in human 
history. Those events, together with the words of Jesus, as quickly codified in the 
Gospels, carried an ethical message some of which could readily be translated 
into the set of ethical principles listed above. Jesus clearly assumed that his 
listeners could distinguish between the morally good and the morally evil, that 
they held that difference to be absolute, that the difference had been established 
by God, that there was a divine retribution that both as a reward and a 
punishment had two characteristics: it transcended all human imagination (eyes 
have not seen, ears have not heard . . . ), and it was eternal, in the form either of 
heaven or hell. 
The minds and consciences of those to whom Jesus preached had been formed 
by the Old Testament tradition, itself steeped in a sequence of historical events. 
Suffice it to mention the phrasing and promulgation ofthe Ten Commandments, 
which, let it be noted in passing, are in some essentials very different from, and in 
general far superior to (in clarity, conciseness, and depth) the Code of Hamurabi. 
Further, an implicitly eternal perspective was emphasized in the Mosaic warning 
that a choice between life and death was involved. 
Undoubtedly Jesus' listeners were far better prepared for his ethical message 
than were the pagans to whom Paul preached. Yet the first chapter to the Romans 
is a classic proof that Paul could readily assume a broad moral agreement on the 
part of pagans on a number of crucial points. He could assume that pagans knew 
that a variety of human acts were inherently sinful, that it was possible to avoid 
them, and that there was a divine sanction connected with moral rules witnessed 
by their conscience. 
Still, Paul also knew that reference to the deeds and words of Jesus carried a far 
greater persuasive force than did all general ethical propositions, however valid, 
aimed at man's natural moral conscience. Christian morality and moral 
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consciousness was, from the start, riveted in the historical facts of Jesus' words 
insofar as they had been most intimately connected with and strengthened by his 
miracles, death and resurrection. In preaching to King Agrippa, Paul could see 
before his very eyes the dramatic manner in which the moral bearing of Christ's 
resurrection unfolded itself. King Agrippa listened to him with pure intellectual 
curiosity until the resurrection of Jesus came up. Then the king quickly cut Paul 
short, lest he would be forced to become a Christian. Conversion to Christianity 
has always been much more a matter of moral change than a purely intellectual 
shift of perspectives. 
Owing to various historical factors, the Christian notion of ethics began to 
dominate the Western World from the time of Charlemagne on. The domination 
was well-nigh complete during the High Middle Ages. In those centuries 
practically no intellectual could come forth with a praise of evil men, let alone 
with a justification of evil immoral acts. The praise of evil acts, at least in the form 
of novels and bawdy poetry, became noticeable only from the fifteenth century 
on. A major instance of this is Chaucer's Canterbury Tales where, time and again 
one is faced with laughter over various forms of immoral behavior, although 
lamentation would have been the response only a hundred or so years earlier. 
There is nothing "comic" in Dante's Divine Comedy in spite of the poet's graphic 
references to human frailty. 
Moral depravity in the Catholic clergy, and the clergy's heavy reliance on the 
material benefits oflanded property, could but further undermine the domination 
of Christian ethics. It is no accident that the Franciscan Reform movement 
centered on the crucial moral role of voluntary personal poverty and on the 
resolve that even the religious community should not have possessions, especially 
landed property. Catholic reform movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries could cope with relative ease with purely personal sins, but they were 
hampered by the unethical ballast of what would be called today the various 
forms of real estate. 
The Protestant Reformation was, from its very start, compromised by the 
pressure of opportunities, that is, the opportunities to get rich on the spoils of 
confiscated ecclesiastical property. Emphasis on personal freedom of conscience 
led to such a sudden and spectacular rise of immorality in German lands as to 
make the old Luther wish that he had never started with his work. Luther did not 
suspect that four hundred years later a large segment of Protestantism would 
thematically hold sets of ethical principles that roundly contradict the ones 
included in the set outlined above. It is a set which, as was emphasized, arose, 
developed and flourished within the Christian supernatural matrix, that is, in 
close attention to the great historical facts and events embodied in the very 
supernatural life of Jesus. In the measure in which the Western World, both in 
Protestant and in Catholic lands, began to doubt those facts, its morality too 
became the subject of wholesale dOUbting. 
About this rather painful development within Protestantism it may be useful to 
recall a few details, so that one may better understand the true physiognomy of 
bioethics. Insofar as that physiognomy is naturalistic, it owes much to the shift 
toward naturalism, The latter had been registered in a number of ways. Here I 
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should like to recall a telling incident. Although I am the only witness, its 
instructiveness should be very broad. It involves a very prominent Protestant 
theologian as he and I were discussing questions of ecumenics about twenty years 
ago. Suddenly, he sighed and said: "Protestantism logically leads to naturalism." 
The naturalism in question can take on astonishing forms. Thus one American 
Protestant theologian defended, in my presence, not only abortion but an 
unrestricted right to abortion on the ground that in America the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ must conform to the spirit of individual liberty laid down in the 
Constitution. Obviously, in the process the Gospel is reduced to the level of the 
so-called Social Gospel, a purely natural commodity. Naturalism is less 
obviously present in the remark of a great Protestant moral theologian whom 
everybody holds to be on the conservative side. A few months before his death, 
he told me in the presence of two other no less prominent colleagues of his: "The 
true church is where you feel comfortable." This is the kind of not-too-subtle 
subjectivism that has always been the principal source of a naturalism that readily 
accommodates the latest urges and comforts of nature. 
It was to this development within Protestantism that Cardinal Willebrands 
drew, in a significant context, a still not sufficiently registered attention. Had 
Cardinal Willebrands not been known as a most generous Catholic ecumenist, he 
would not have been invited to give a lecture at Princeton Theological Seminary, 
a stronghold of American Calvinism. The year was 1972, the height of 
ecumenical expectations. He was listened to with rapt attention but there was a 
moment during his speech when one could almost hear a pin drop. This came 
after he had noted that some progress had been made in lessening some of the 
doctrinal differences between Catholics and Protestants. But, he continued, at the 
same time a new sort of difference was arising between Catholics and Protestants, 
a difference turning more and more into a chasm. It was about matters ethical. 
There is indeed today a chasm, which looks unbridgeable, between Catholic 
moral doctrines and the moral doctrines widely entertained in liberal Protestant 
circles, usually referred to as the mainline Protestant Churches: Lutheran, 
Presbyterian, Anglican, Methodist, and Baptist. 
These Churches saw a great many defections during the last twenty years. 
Some of them lost more than half their membership. The president of Princeton 
Theological Seminary calculated that if the rate of defection continues, there will 
be no Presbyterians left by 2015 in the United States. Where did those go who 
defected? Some of them gave up altogether their Christian faith. Some others 
joined fundamentalist churches, which appear, I may add, with increasing 
frequency even in Hungary. A year or so ago, a prominent Hungarian Reformed 
theologian drove me by one such newly constructed church in Debrecen, the 
Calvinist Rome in Hungary. He was not happy at all. Nor was I, but for reasons 
not entirely identical with his. At any rate, although many of those 
fundamentalists are very serious about Christian ethics, it is impossible to engage 
in any meaningful conversation with them. 
Still another part of those who defected are swelling the ranks of the so-called 
Evangelicals. Evangelical Christians want to keep much of traditional doctrine, 
especially the sense of the supernatural. They rightly insist that it is by keeping the 
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right morals that one becomes above all a true follower of Christ. Their chief 
objection to the mainline Protestant churches relates to the various compromises 
that have been made there in matters of morality. In fact, the Evangelicals think 
that the real problem with mainline Protestant churches is that the reformers tried 
to keep something of the Catholic ecclesiastical structure. Consequently, the 
Evangelicals do their best to remain, as a body, a'l different from a church as 
possible. Their local congregations form only very loose, very informal ties with 
one another. But because they have so high a regard for traditional Christian 
ethics and because they want to preserve the supernatural, Evangelicals are 
looking with increasing sympathy toward the Catholic Church. In fact, in order 
to stem the tide of rampant immorality in the United States, Evangelicals have 
recently proposed that they and the Catholic Church form a common front. Part 
of that proposal contains their explicit admission that the Holy Spirit has been 
working in the Roman Catholic Church. The significance of that admission 
cannot be emphasized enough. 
Obviously, if one has kept any supernatural sensitivity, only something 
supernatural can be seen in the firmness with which the Catholic Church 
maintains its doctrine in morals, against huge social, cultural, and political 
pressures. In addition to the official Catholic doctrine, there are a great many 
Catholics, clergy and laity, who hold fast to that moral doctrine. They do so 
inasmuch as they see in the Church the Pillar of Truth. Not surprisingly, the many 
Catholics who search for compromises in bioethics cannot help fomenting 
dissent from the voice of the Magisterium. This is why the latest encyclical, 
Veritatis Splendor, has one unique distinction among its various well-nigh unique 
features. 
Veritatis Splendor is perhaps the longest of all the encyclicals in their entire 
history of a little over two hundred years. It is also the most meditative. Most of its 
pages cannot be read without gaining the impression that one is being given a 
most evangelical set of instructions, arguments, exhortations and reflections. 
Length does not, of course, necessarily make an essential difference. Meditative, 
exhortative paragraphs and copious references to the Gospels are not absent in 
othe encyclicals. But no other encyclical contains the admission that in matters of 
moral teaching there is a widespread dissent within the Catholic church, a dissent 
that goes far beyond the ranks of professors of moral theology. In fact the Pope 
himself introduces the registering of that dissent with the words that it is a "new 
situation ... within the Christian community itself; ... it is no longer a matter of 
limited and occasional dissent, but of an overall and systematic calling into 
question of traditional doctrine."2 
The chief form of dissent is consequentialism, or the doctrine that the ethical 
goodness of an action should be evaluated in terms of the entire impact of the 
action on the individual's pursuit of happy and virtuous living. Such a pursuit can 
indeed serve as the basis of moral happiness and even of a genuine ethical 
philosophy. Much of Aristotle's ethical teaching about that pursuit could be 
taken over by Thomas Aquinas. But Aquinas also emphasized that supernatural 
perfection, virtue, and happiness constitute a much higher norm and impose new 
constraints with far greater force than can be the case with a purely natural ethics. 
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Consequential ism cannot indeed be shown to be different from Benthamist 
utilitarianism. There the weighing of the respective amounts of pleasure and pain 
constitute the foundation of purely natural ethical considerations. But just as 
Bentham could not give tangible forms in which his "felicific calculus" should 
operate, champions of consequentialism too have been unable to specify what 
consequence should weigh more or weigh less. In consequentialism, it is the 
individual's personal wish that carries the chief weight in what he allows himself. 
And this is precisely where modern secular ethical considerations have stood 
for some time. Kant's categorical imperative, with its absolutely binding rules, 
carries little conviction today. The same is true of the efforts of the deists who 
never really invoked their distant God as the sanction of man's absolute ethical 
duties. Today very few in number are those ethical theorists who follow G.E. 
Moore's intuitionist ethics according to which man has an innate intuitive 
perception of what is ethically good in an objective and universally valid sense. 
That ethical norms are purely subjective and/or culturally and socially 
conditioned has for some time been the prevailing view on ethics. This view 
found support in widely differing trends and ideologies, such as Darwinism, 
Marxism, comparative cultural studies, Freudian psychoanalysis, existentialism, 
deconstruction ism. To say with Marx that moral and religious norms are but 
"phantoms formed in tbehuman brain" or "sublimates of their material life 
processes"3 is not much ruder than the claim of the logical-positivist, A. J . Ayer, 
that since moral arguments cannot be scientifically verified they are nothing more 
than "ejaculations or commands," so many "pure expressions of feeling that have 
no objective validity whatsoever."4 
Freud's claim that moral conscience is but an internalized fear of losing the 
love of one's parents5 yields no more objectivity than the claim of William G. 
Sumner, a famous cultural anthropologist around 1900, that "the mores can 
make anything right."6 Indeed, this is what behaviorists such as J . B. Watson had 
in mind in claiming that by scientifically controlling someone's mores or 
behavior anybody can be turned either into a saint or into a profligate.7 Sartre 
drew the full logic of his existentialism in stating that since God does not exist 
"there is no human nature" and "so man cannot find anything to depend upon 
either within or outside himself."8 According to Richard Rorty, regarded by 
some as the most influential philosopher today in America, there is no "core-self' 
or an inherently human quality. Therefore no action is inherently inhuman, be it 
as abhorrent as the course of action connected with Auschwitz. If Rorty abhors 
the holocaust, it is only because history and circumstance supplied him with 
certain beliefs.9 
There are, of course, some ethicists within the secular context who plead the 
truth of an ethics with universally valid objective norms. A rather recent case is 
the impressive effort of James Q. Wilson. In his book The Moral Sense he shows 
that empirical research can demonstrate that there is a universal moral consensus 
outside the relatively small circle of intellectuals (a circle which, I would add, 
includes the much larger number of media people). Outside those circles, Wilson 
argues, people are led by habits that remarkably survive and outlive changing 
intellectual and cultural fads. Furthermore, he also shows that the principal 
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source of moral consciousness for modern times has been the Church's teaching, 
legislation, and education about marriage and family life. Although not a 
Catholic, and possibly not a Protestant, Wilson even calls attention to the 
immensely formative force of the example set by the Church's constant preaching 
about a family that consisted of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph.lO For, according to 
Wilson, it is within the family that a human being's social sense is developed, 
which in turn is the matrix of the adolescent's and adult's moral awareness. 
Wilson's thesis is confirmed by the much higher proportion of criminals who 
grew up without the guiding hand of a father. Such is at least the case in the 
United States where two-thirds of black children and one-third of white children 
are now born out of wedlock. 
Valuable as such conclusions and observations are, they hardly make a dent on 
the fully relativistic moral atmosphere of educated circles, and of most of those, 
such as the media people, who set the tone of public discourse about morality. 
That tone is profoundly subjectivist, pragmatist, hedonist, and relativist, some 
apparently selfless statements notwithstanding. It is that tone which is a chief 
characteristic of most of those scientists who are responsible for the creation of 
molecular biology which in turn gave rise to bioethics, or the new-fangled ethical 
concern about life. 
The creation in question deserves to be called the Eighth-Day of Creation. II 
Owing to the discovery of the double-helix structure of chromosomes and of 
recombinant DNA, molecular biologists have quickly become aware of their 
ability to re-create human beings, shape them at will, and take in hand the course 
of man's evolution. Once on that course, anything can be made to order, We are, 
indeed, already on that course. In only twenty years, man reached the point 
where the cloning of any individual is not only possible but also feasible and 
indeed is under way. Preservation of human semen is done on a vast commercial 
basis. The grafting of the brain or head of a monkey onto another is done openly 
in some laboratories as a preliminary to attempts to graft a human head onto 
another human body. Compared with the ethical problems created along these 
lines, the importation and exportation of brain tissues taken from live human 
embryos should seem bordering on innocence, gravely unethical as it may appear 
within the old ethics, though not at all within the new bioethics. 
Only a few among leading molecular biologists would hold with Erwin 
Chargaff that while they are free to harm themselves, they are not free ethically to 
inflict on others "one iota of danger."12 No greater is the number of those 
microbiologists who changed heart, as did Robert Sinsheimer, about the 
unlimited freedom of scientific research. No longer is it enough, Sinsheimer told 
the Genetic Society of America in 1975, "to wave the flag of Galileo." 13 That flag 
is being waved by all those molecular biologists who hold what Chargaff called 
the Devil's Principle: "Whatever can be done, must be done."14 That principle 
had already been obeyed when scientists went ahead with the construction of the 
atomic bomb on the ground that it was merely superb physics and that after all it 
was, to quote Oppenheimer's defense of it, a technically sweet project. 
Laboratories of molecular biology are full of the scent of that sweetness, 
reminiscent of the fragrance of heroin dispensed to lull ethical sensibilities. 
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And how about doctors on whom it ultimately depends whether or not the 
various feats of molecular biology will be applied on patients? Most of them are 
in agreement with the reasoning one finds in the chapter on abortion in the book 
When Doctors Disagree, a book first published in 1973. In recalling the 
opposition of some 300 gynecologist-consultants to the British Abortion act, the 
author finds it strange that a mere 300 should prevail over 15,000 general 
practitioners and 30 million Britons who want abortion when in need of it. This 
turning of morality into an opinion poll is sad enough, but even more so is the 
consciousness with which it is done. On the one hand, the author, Dr. Louis 
Goldman, claims that the "ultimate ethical sanction lies in the moral sense of the 
community." At the same time he admits that modern society "may be a sick 
society," but only to disclaim even the small measure of moral sanity implied in 
that admission. For his parting shot is a warning that holding on to what may be 
the healthy or sane ethical view could be equivalent to practicing "the sin of 
ethical pride, one of the deadly virtues."15 
Any religious person who shies away from virtue because it may trap him in the 
sin of spiritual pride is spritually sick. A society that is so sick as to turn away from 
the specter of health is in a worse condition than that old pagan society that Paul 
and other Christians had to confront. No reasoning can be worse than that which 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun gave in explaining why there 
should be no death penalty: "It seems that the decision whether a human being 
should live or die is so inherently subjective - rife with all oflife's understanding, 
experiences, prejUdices, and passions - that it inevitably defies the rationality and 
consistency required by the Constitution."16 In other words, Blackmun claimed 
that reason or logic or clarity should not be obeyed, because man can sometimes 
think and act confusedly if not irrationally. But confusion is supported even when 
recognized as confusion. A case in point is the decision in August 1993 of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court about a patently absurd adoption ruling. "We cannot 
continue to pretend," Judge Phillip M. Fredman said in support of his ruling, "that 
there is one formula, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to 
achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children should inhabit."17 
In other words, since modern society has no generally shared ethical 
principles, the personal wish of anyone should be given as much leeway as 
possible. This is the argument that supported the criticism in the The New York 
Times of the unanimous conclusion of a panel set up by Governor Cuomo to 
advise him on ethical matters. The panel unanimously urged the governor to 
oppose doctor-assisted suicides. But that very influential newspaper quoted 
without criticism the assertion of the president of the Hemlock (pro-suicide) 
Society that the panel cannot reverse the groundswell of public support for 
doctor-assisted suicide. ls This groundswell is driven by the wish that the law 
should support in every possible way what the individual sees fit for his self-
fulfillment. The very latest and almost macabre case relates to the removal ofthe 
sperm from a brain-dead man so that his young widow may be impregnated with 
it a year from now and have a child. The approval of the deceased young man's 
mother speaks for itself: "My son loved Pam (the wife) and he loved children. 
This is what he would have wanted."19 The Romans of old had a phrase for this: 
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stet pro ratione vo/untas. 
Our modern society is the first in history that tries to base morality either on 
personal wishes or on opinion polls. And this is the kind of morality society wants 
to hear from a new professional group, called medical ethicists or bioethicists. 
They readily comply, because compliance assures their professional prosperity. 
Twenty years ago they numbered only a few hundred. Today, in the United 
States, there are several thousands of them. No hospital, no medical school, no 
clinic is without one or two. No university is now without a course or two on 
medical ethics, taught by these ethicists. They can indeed go so far in pleading the 
cause of ethical relativism as to openly warn, as did two ethicists from the medical 
ethics program of the University of Wisconsin Medical School in the pages ofthe 
New York Times, that "an ethicist is no more capable than any random person 
selected from the phone book to render judgements on the morality of a 
particular novel procedure such as fetal ovarian transplant. All that bioethicists 
can offer is a somewhat less politically or emotionally charged, somewhat more 
dispassionate evaluation of our options." In line with this they recommended to 
their fellow ethicists that they should never give their personal opinions on 
anything. Otherwise, the ethicist profession may turn into a "self-appointed, 
secular version of the Committee for the Defense of the Faith."20 
If ethicists are, then, supposed to avoid even the semblance of endorsing 
statements that are objectively and universally valid, what shall they teach? The 
answer is simple: they will teach the verbal art of avoiding ethical issues while 
profusely using ethical terms. A professor of medical ethics at a big American 
University told me that in discussing any case with young doctors, he carefully 
avoids pushing the discussion to the point where questions about absolute moral 
good and evil would arise. Only a month ago a long report was published about a 
newly appointed head of the department of medical ethics at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Halfway through the interview the reporter, on seeing that the 
ethicist had no moral agenda, asked: "With no moral agenda, don't you have 
trouble explaining to people where you stand?" The ethicist replied that he was 
an "outcome-oriented pragmatist." As such he saw it as his task to establish 
"what a patient and a doctor want to achieve, and then ask what values and 
principles are needed to get them there."21 
Clearly, this was an ill-disguised admission that it was the business ofbioethics 
to justify anything the patient and/or the doctor wanted. And the reporter fully 
sensed this implication as he came back with his next question: "Other medical 
disciplines have strict protocols. Why is [bio ]ethics different?" The answer to this 
question had already been implied in the ethicist's self-characterization that he 
was a "bubble-up" ethicist. He wanted thereby to set himself apart from "trickle 
down" ethicists,22 namely, those who start from a general principle and apply it to 
particular cases, as had always been the case in any ethical system respectful of 
the difference between what is morally good and what is morally evil. In order to 
give scientific "respectablitity" to his procedure he argued that there was no need 
to master the unified field theory in order to launch a space shuttle or to repair a 
sewer line. 
This apparently clever argument merely covered up a fallacy. While one could 
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argue that not even Werner von Braun needed to know unified field theory, 
nevertheless the space shuttle would get off the ground only if the practical 
engineering were in accord with the basic universal principles of true physics, be 
that physics the unified field theory or not. Disregard of this connection is a 
celebration of fallacy. Discourses ofbioethicists are typically full of these types of 
fallacies. That reporters can see through the verbal acrobatics of ethicists makes 
one wonder why an ethicist does not smile on hearing another ethicist hand down 
his dark words of wisdom. They do not seem, indeed, to be any better than the 
haruspices of Roman times, about whom Cicero recalled Cato's wonderment as 
to to how they could refrain from laughing when seeing one another. 
So much in way of illustration of the conclusion toward which we have been 
heading, namely, that bioethics, as practiced and articulated nowadays, is 
without ethical foundations properly so called. What makes this situation far 
worse is that Christian ecumenical gatherings on bioethics are time and again 
productive of the same kind of fog and nebulosity that characterizes the 
discourses of secular ethicists. And as soon as a clear-cut affirmation is made of 
age-old Christian ethical norms and conclusions on particular, specific issues, it is 
classified as a purely confessional or denominational matter. Is not this the 
theological equivalent of the tactic whereby the category of truth versus error is 
avoided by a convenient recourse to the categories of conservative versus liberal, 
traditional versus progressive, or to take our case, dogmatic versus ecumenical? 
In this process nothing remains safe, not even God's historic Covenant with 
man, the only really reliable source of the clear-cut positions of Christian ethics. 
The absolute validity of those positions is indeed dismissed in the recently 
published Theological Voices in Medical Ethics23 through the method oflabeling 
them "covenantal." What is implied here is the suggestion that a Christian is free 
to be "Covenantal" or not, or that he has at least some latitude concerning the 
measure in which he is basing his moral theology on the Covenant of God with 
man. There is no such freedom. This is precisely a principal point made in the 
encyclical Veritatis Splendor. Indeed, its most persuasive and most inspirational 
aspect is its covenantal character. Throughout the encyclical the Pope reminds us 
that there is a Covenant between God and man and that it cannot be reinvented 
again. 
That Covenant culminates in the Church insofar as the Church is the Pillar of 
Truth, to recall Paul's words to Timothy. And if the Church is such a pillar, it has 
to be so in matters ethical and bioethical as well. Truth is indivisible. While in 
matters of dogma it is possible to take cover in endless conceptual refinements 
and to celebrate ecumenism, in matters of ethics this tactic is not possible, for a 
very simple reason. Ethical matters, especially matters ofbioethics, cut into one's 
flesh and blood. But even in dogma there are limits. One can argue at length 
about the validity of this or that form of ordination. But in doing the ordination 
only that form can be chosen which is undoubtedly valid. And even more 
relevant is this distinction when it comes to moral questions. There the moment 
of action all too often cannot be delayed. And an action that kills does not cease 
to be plain killing if one thinks at length about it after it has been completed. 
Here the latitudes of ecumenism are rapidly narrowing, as has been made all 
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too clear by the establishment of a new Pontifical Academy for bioethics. Only 
those can be members who unequivocally state their agreement with the 
Church's teaching on contraception, abortion, and euthanasia. Obviously, it is 
realized that there is no point in wasting time to re-argue the basics until 
doomsday comes. Unfortunately, that doomsday may be much closer than we 
suspect. Western society is approaching the point where it can no longer keep a 
police force sufficiently large to contain the rapid growth of crime. A society 
which no longer believes in angels, those touchstones of genuine belief in the 
supernatural, has now to face the dire consequence: Our society can no longer 
logically demand that its policeman, or doctors, or lawyers (let alone its 
politicians) beilave like angels. 
We Christians have a very limited measure in opposing this trend. The 
paginization of modern society grows by leaps and bounds. This acceleration is 
but the latest phase of a process that started two centuries ago, the secularization 
of Western culture. Who is responsible for it? Of course, the Enemy should not 
be forgotten. He keeps sowing the cockles until the end of time. Still, we 
Christians have a share of responsibilty in that de·-christianization. 
Nobody may have specified the source of that share better than a non-
Christian thinker of out times. I mean the non-religious Jewish philosopher, 
Hannah Arendt. In her book The Human Condition she speaks of the 
Cartesian dubito as the starting point of that secularization. But she also says 
that it was relatively harmless as long as it remained in the hands of 
professional atheists whose arguments "all too often were vulgar and easily 
refutable by traditional theology." The Cartesian dubito, she says, become 
disastrously effective only when it was grafted onto religious philosophy by 
Pascal and Kierkegaard, whom she calls " the two greatest religious thinkers 
of modernity."24 
Whatever the truth of Arendt's evaluation of Pascal's influence, Kierkegaard 
certainly fueled a trend, however well-intentioned, towards subjectivism and 
thus away from the objectively supernatural. Arendt perceived this connection 
at least to the extent of adding that modern secularism is the fruit of "the 
doubting concern with salvation of genuinely religious men, in whose eyes the 
traditional Christian content and promise had become 'absurd"'.25 Much of the 
new theology is replete with at least covert references to the absurdity of 
traditional positions. No wonder that the new theology is notably impotent in 
coping with the thorough lack of ethics in the new bioethics. That void cannot 
be replenished except through traditional adherence to that Christ in whom 
God's fullness was made evident to man. The greater the number of Christians 
who immerse themselves in that fullness, the greater will be their shared 
confidence that they will stand firm while the horrible storms of bioethics blow 
wildly through society. But it is precisely tradition, or the lesson of history, that 
has made all too clear where that firmness is concretely anchored. None other 
than the "Pauline" Paul described it to Timothy as the Pillar of Truth, which, 
since he meant by this the visible Church, had to be its very "Petrine" form. 
Indeed, it alone of all Church-forms has a bioethics with truly ethical 
foundations. 
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